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Summary
Drawing upon the examples of Bulgaria and Hungary, this article explores employee represen­
tation and voice in SMEs in central and eastern Europe in the context of the spectacular devel­
opment of the SME sector during the post-1990 transition and associated changes in labour 
relations and collective bargaining practices. The article examines the relationship between the 
regulation of employment relations and employee representation and voice. It suggests that the 
absence of formal channels of representation in SMEs hides the existence of a number of 
informal compromises between employers and employees over matters such as wages, work­
ing time, and health and safety conditions. The authors argue that future trade union strate­
gies should be based on a clear understanding of these social realities.
Sommaire
Cet article examine, en se referant aux exemples de la Bulgarie et de la Hongrie, la voix et la 
representation des travailleurs dans les PME en Europe Centrale et de I’Est dans le contexte 
de revolution spectaculaire du secteurdes PME pendant la transition post-1990 ainsi que les 
changements qui y sont associes dans les relations de travail et les pratiques en matiere de 
negociation collective. L ’article analyse les liens entre la reglementation en matiere de rela­
tions d ’emploi et la representation et la voix des travailleurs. II suggere que i'absence de canaux 
formels de representation dans les PME cache I’existence d’un certain nombre d’engagements 
informels entre les employeurs et les travailleurs sur des sujets tels que les salaires, le temps de 
travail, et les conditions d’hygiene et de securite. Pour les auteurs, les futures strategies syndi­
cates devraient etre basees sur une comprehension claire des realites sociales.
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Zusammenfassung
Am Beispiel Bulgariens und Ungams werden in diesem Artikel die Vertretung und die ‘voice’ 
von Arbeitnehmern in KMU in Mittel- und Osteuropa untersucht, vor dem Hintergrund der 
spektakuldren Entwicklung des KMU-Sektors seit Beginn des Umbaus nach 1990 und den 
damit verbundenen Anderungen der Arbeitsbeziehungen und der Tarifverhandlungspraxis. 
Der Artikel priift die Zusammenhange zwischen der Regulierung der Beschdftigungs- 
beziehungen, der Arbeitnehmervertretung und der Mitsprache. Erformuliert die These, dass 
der Mangel an offiziellen Kandlen fur die Vertretung in KMU die Existenz einer Reihe von 
informellen Vereinbarungen zwischen Arbeitgebem und Arbeitnehmern kaschiert, so zum 
Beispiel iiber das Entgelt, die Arbeitszeit und Gesundheits- und Sicherheitsfragen. Die 
Autoren pladieren dafiir, bei kunftigen Gewerkschaftsstrategien diese soziale Realitat deut- 
licher zur Kenntnis zu nehmen.
Keywords: central and eastern Europe, transformation, SMEs, labour relations, trade 
unions
Before 1990 employment in central and eastern European countries (CEECs) was con­
centrated in large state-owned companies and jobs were secure. During the transition of 
the past 16 years, employment has gradually transferred to the emerging small and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector and has become precarious. Employment in 
SMEs in CEECs is generally outside the coverage of collective bargaining, which 
remains concentrated on large enterprises and the public sector. Taking account of this 
transitional context and drawing upon the examples of Bulgaria and Hungary, we argue 
that SMEs play a dual role in the economic performance of CEECs in promoting eco­
nomic and social development while simultaneously generating informal mechanisms 
that substitute for formal labour relations. Large-scale European quantitative surveys 
provide information about the presence or absence of trade unions or the existence of 
such participative institutions as works councils in SMEs.1 Such surveys, however, can­
not explain the realities of social relations in the sector in the post-socialist societies or 
allow us to draw conclusions about the nature of employee voice. On the basis of the 
12 case studies of Bulgarian and Hungarian SMEs carried out as part of the SMALL 
project, this paper examines the relationship between the regulation of employment 
relations in SMEs and employee representation and voice. This examination is con­
ducted in the context of (1) the spectacular development of the SME sector during the 
post-socialist transition; (2) changing labour relations, and (3) collective bargaining
1 Carried out by organisations such as the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO), International 
Labour Office (ILO), OECD or the Observatory of European SMEs.
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practices. The paper then (4) provides examples of employee representation in several 
sectors of the economy and (5) makes a number of recommendations to policy-makers 
and the trade unions in the region.
The rise of the SME sector in the post-socialist economies
In the context of the socio-economic transformation, the development of the SME sec­
tor in CEECs is regarded as an important condition for economic growth and the cre­
ation of employment. Throughout the region SMEs grew continuously throughout the 
1990s, both in absolute numbers and in their importance for employment, production, 
value added and exports (Eurostat 2003). Their development took place in an environ­
ment of institutional support and public policies that were not concerned with the type 
of employment generated in small businesses. The fundamental liberalisation of eco­
nomic life, the de-monopolisation of enterprises and the emergence of autonomous 
social and economic actors in the post-socialist period influenced organisational struc­
tures. All these processes were accompanied by the establishment of a new system of 
industrial relations, which is examined in the second part of this article. Economic 
restructuring and fast growing unemployment forced large groups of the population to 
look to the emerging SME sector for their economic survival.2
In the social sciences, the early 1990s saw a number of studies of the so-called ‘transfor­
mation economies’, which enriched the literature on the political, economic and social 
changes that were taking place in CEECs. During this decade, the theoretical concept 
of ‘path-dependency’ helped social scientists refute the view of change as occurring with­
in an ‘institutional vacuum’, a view which overlooked the importance of the varied socio­
economic and cultural histories of these countries. As Chavance (1995: 288) has stated; 
‘the path-dependent emergence of a new, post-socialist form of capitalism calls for a 
complex evolutionary interpretation of this great transformation, as opposed to the “big 
bang” view which, as the metaphor itself suggests, overlooks the historical legacy’. The 
‘path-dependency’ approach provides a better understanding of the variety of develop­
ment trajectories in the post-socialist economies in the CEE region and highlights the 
evolutionary character of social-economic and technological development. The explana­
tory strength of this approach was helpful in understanding the ‘destruction’ of the state- 
socialist political and economic regime, together with the ‘reconstruction’ of the market 
economy and the democratic political institutions in the post-socialist economies. This 
view enables us to understand the uneven development of the post-socialist firms and 
their management. Thus privatisation, market competition and foreign direct invest­
ment (FDI) were the main drivers of economic development and modernisation in the 
CEECs, but ‘social filters’ (the labour relations system, educational and training instit­
utions and regional development agencies) also played a significant role, as it was
2 The SME sector was not a completely new phenomenon, deriving from the post-socialist transition. Some 
proto-entrepreneurial initiatives existed during the 1980s, as a result of various attempts to overcome the 
shortcomings of the state socialist planning system. However, following the ‘start’ of the transformation 
process, the creation of private firms became a key tool by which citizens adapted to the emerging market 
economies.
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Table 1: Changing ‘organisational morphology’ in the post-socialist economies:
EU-15 ACC (1) cz EE CY LV
Industry and services (3)
All sizes (units) 
of which: 13 447 079 2 476 463 741 762 2 946 36 032
Micro (%) 90.6 93.4 94.6 78.5 76.9
Small (%) 7.9 5.2 4.4 17.8 18.9
Medium (%) 1.2 1.2 0.9 3.3 3.7
Large (%) 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5
Industry and construction
All sizes (units) 
of which: 3 656 464 729 755 252 297 6 775 1 214 7 603
Micro (%) 84.0 88.7 91.8 59.2 57.8
Small (%) 13.2 8.0 6.1 31.0 31.3
Medium (%) 2.3 2.7 1.7 8.4 9.2
Large (%) 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.3 1.7
Services
All sizes (units) 
of which: 9 790 615 1 746 708 489 465 22 690 28 429
Micro (%) 93.1 96.3 96.0 84.2 82.0
Small (%) 6.0 4.0 3.5 13.8 15.6
Medium (%) 0.8 0.6 0.4 1.8 2.2
Large (%) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
(1) Acceding and candidate countries.
(2) Micro enterprises, 5-9 employees and not 1-9 employees; total for all enterprises covers 5 and more employees.
(3) PL, breakdown by enterprise size class, 2000. Source: Eurostat, Structural business statistics (theme 4r’sts’size clas). 
Source: Eurostat 2003, p. 34.
through these that the various social actors (owners, managers, the state, workers and 
their representative associations) experienced and ‘digested’ the changes.
However, none of the above-mentioned approaches would appear sufficient on their 
own to explain the factors triggering the spectacular growth of the SME sector in the 
post-socialist societies in terms of employment. The non-enforcement of legislation cov­
ering employment and employment representation must also be taken into account.
In Bulgaria, a review of the available data illustrates the spectacular growth of SMEs for 
the period 1989-2004. If at the beginning of the transition in 1989 the SME sector was 
almost non-existent (there were some 24 500 registered private companies), almost 13 
years later SMEs represented 99% of all enterprises (or an estimated 216 000 in 2004). 
By 2004 SMEs generated 79% of employment, 75% of turnover and 61% of the value 
added to private enterprises.3
| 98 Transfer 1/07
Labour relations, collective bargaining and employee voice in SMEs in central and eastern Europe
spectacular growth O f SMEs Number of enterprises, 2001
LT HU (2) MT PL SI SK BG RO TR
57 621 56 125 1 417 142 71 472 36 910 300 310
81.5 51.0 96.5 91.0
14.9 40.2 2.4 23.4 9.9
3.2 0.9 5.2 2.6
0.4 0.2
12 993 23 329 378 048 26 302 10 259 57 753
64.6 41.7 92.5 87.3 50.1 67.0
25.4 44.6 4.8 34.2 21.2
8.6 11.9 9.0
1.5 3.7 2.8
44 628 32 796 1 089 094 45 170 26 651 242 567
86.4 57.6 93.2
11.9 37.0 5.9 19.2 7.2
1.6 4.6 0.5 2.6 1.1
0.2 0.8 0.1
In Hungary, the fundamental changes in ownership within the economy, from the end 
of the 1980s, also significantly influenced the organisational morphology of the country. 
As a result, the number of registered businesses doubled between 1990 and 1995 and 
reached 1 million by 1995. The number of registered enterprises, approximately 400 000 
in 1990, grew by more than two and a half in a decade. The overwhelming majority 
(95%) were based upon self-employment, and these doubled in number by the mid- 
1990s, but then fell back somewhat due to recession and unfavourable regulations. 
Today, 75.5% of the 1.1 million registered companies are actually in operation.
SME characteristics
Comparing the growth of the SME sectors in CEECs, using the examples of Bulgaria 
and Hungary, we can draw some general conclusions. After 1989 employment patterns 
changed significantly. The share of employment in SMEs started from almost zero in 
Bulgaria. In both countries this share has grown continuously over the last 15 years.
3 ASME, Annual Report 2004, http://www.sme.government.bg/en/AnnualReportSME2004EN.pdf
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However, it seems that the role of SMEs in employment generation and in economic 
performance was realised later in Bulgaria than in Hungary. In the former, SMEs for a 
long time could only partially absorb the outflows from the labour market, as a result of 
the liquidation of large enterprises and economic restructuring (Beleva 2001). Yet, 
regional and sectoral differences are important in both countries. For example, examin­
ing the sectoral distribution of firms by size, in Bulgaria the largest number of firms can 
be found in the following sectors: real estate, rental and business services (227 946 
firms) and trade, repair of motor vehicles and consumer goods (195 472 firms). In 
Bulgaria more than half of SMEs operate in the sphere of commerce, 12% are in man­
ufacturing, about 10% in real estate and business services and another 10% in hotels, 
restaurants and catering. ‘In Hungary, the distribution of enterprises by sectors is more 
balanced: 28% of the enterprises operate in the real estate sector, 24% in commerce, 
10-10% in manufacturing and in construction, 6% belong to the category of transport 
and communication, 5% operate in the field of hotels and restaurants, while the sectors 
of financial intermediation, education and health care are represented by 3-3.3%. 8% of 
the SMEs belong to the category of other businesses.’ (Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal 
(Hungarian Central Statistical Office) (2006)4
SMEs developed the ability to generate informal mechanisms for coping with the tur­
bulent institutional environment of the post-socialist economies. They relied extensive­
ly on flexible practices -  such as keeping two sets of books and a combination of formal 
and informal5 employment contracts -  and this had a major impact on the labour mar­
ket and employment relations in both the Bulgarian and Hungarian economies. In addi­
tion, it is worth noting the significant differences in the innovation rate by size in the 
CEECs. As the size of the firm increases the innovation activity within the firm becomes 
more intensive. A similar pattern of innovation activity can be observed in the EU-15 
countries (see Palmieri, in this issue); however, in the latter the size of the firm where 
the impact can be observed is smaller.
Labour relations and collective bargaining in the CEE 
region -  examples from Bulgaria and Hungary
The present labour relations system in CEECs was established in the early 1990s, after 
the collapse of the state socialist political and economic regimes. This system was built 
on the basis of institutional transfers, influenced by international organisations such as 
the International Labour Organisation. The state, the emancipated unions (reformed 
old unions such as CITUB in Bulgaria or MSZOSZ in Hungary or newly established 
confederations such as Podkrepa in Bulgaria or Liga in Hungary) and newly established 
employers’ organisations (in Bulgaria formed mainly by company managers appointed 
by the state, belonging to the Bulgarian Industrial Association) entered into social
4 This classification is similar to the NACE classification accepted by all national statistical offices in Europe. 
D ata refer to 2004, source: KSH (2006), pp 26-28.
5 In this article we do not enter into the debate over which is the more appropriate term -  formal/informal 
or official/unofficial and we use the terms interchangeably.
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dialogue over the direction of reform and contributed to the establishment of a number 
of tripartite institutions.
Trade unions
Whereas at the beginning of the transformation process trade union density rates in the 
former socialist countries were extremely high, due to compulsory membership, from 
1990 onwards union membership in all CEECs experienced a dramatic decline. Table 2
Table 2: Trade union density rates and membership composition, 1995-20026
Union density rates Share of all members
1990 1995 2002 Female Public
Belgium 53.9 55.7 55.8* n.d. n.d.
France 10.1 9.8 9.7* 48.3** 66.3**
Hungary n.d. 63.4 19.9 48?** 70.3**
Italy 38.8 38.1 34.0 38.3* 53.1*
Portugal 31.7 25.4 n.d. n.d. n.d.
Sweden 80.0 83.1 78.0 52.7 47.9
UK 39.3 34.1 30.4 43.7 47.4
Czech Republic 78.7 46.3 25.1 57.9* 44.5*
Poland n.d. 32.9 14.7* 55.1* 76.6*
Slovakia 78.7 57.3 35.4 49.6* 70.9*
Slovenia n.d. n.d. 41.0 49.4* 76.2*
Average EU-25*** n.d. 32.6 26.4* n.d. n.d.
Average EU-15*** 32.8 31.0 27.3* n.d. n.d.
Average EU-10*** n.d. 42.7 20.4* n.d. n.d.
* Data available only from 2001.
** The data on membership composition (share of female members; share of members in the public sector)
are calculated from sample surveys of the International Social Science Programme (ISSP) and relate to 1998.
*** Weighted averages. In the event of missing data, the nearest year is taken into account.
6 The data on union density for Bulgaria were not available from official sources, but other sources (e.g. Kirov 
2005) provide the following estimates: about 42% in 1995 and about 26% in 2003. Density rates for EU-15 
countries are standardised, i.e. without unemployed and self-employed, retired employees and student 
members, following the model in Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). In the case of the UK, figures are calcu­
lated from the Labour Force Survey. Elsewhere they are recalculated from administrative sources. See also 
OECD 2004. The EU-10 figures are non-standardised and follow nationally based statistics collected by 
the Institut des Sciences du Travail of the Universite Catholique de Louvain, Monographs on the Situation 
o f social partners in the candidate countries, Brussels, December 2003, a research project conducted on 
behalf of the Employment and Social Affairs DG  of the European Commission. Quoted by European 
Commission 2004, p. 19. Table 2 is an edited version of the original one containing data only for countries 
involved in the SMALL project.
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shows, however, that, within the CEECs, there are substantial differences between 
countries often considered as homogenous. In 2002 the highest unionisation rate was 
registered in Slovenia (41.0%) and the lowest rate was found in Poland (14.7%) in spite 
of the legacy of a strong and militant trade union movement symbolised by the Solidarity 
trade union.
In addition, union density rates vary substantially between private and public sectors. 
For example in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia more than every second union member 
works in the public sector. The higher density rates in the public sector are explained 
partly by the institutional heritage of the post-socialist countries which became EU 
members (on 1 May 2004) and by the difficulties trade unions have in recruiting mem­
bers in the private sector, especially in SMEs and newly established firms (i.e. firms cre­
ated in the form of ‘greenfield’ investments in the so-called ‘trade union free zones’) 
(Mako and Novoszath 1995).
Trade union representation is more fragmented in Hungary, where seven trade union 
confederations were created after the collapse of the state socialist system, than in 
Bulgaria where two confederations have cooperated well since 1995. In Hungary labour 
relations have a dual character; as well as the historical representation of workers’ inter­
ests by trade unions, works councils facilitate employee participation in the companies’ 
decision-making system. However, these two channels of labour relations are interrelat­
ed: the existence of works councils is closely connected with the presence of trade 
unions. According to data from a statistically representative survey carried out in 2002 
in Hungary, works councils, trade unions and collective agreements all increase with the 
size of the firm (Neumann 2002). In 2006 Bulgaria adopted the European Directive 
2002/14/EC on Information and Consultation into its labour code.
Employers’ organisations
Employers’ organisations are similarly fragmented in both countries. In Hungary there 
are nine employers’ organisations at national level, four of which represent the interests 
of SMEs. In Bulgaria four of six nationally representative organisations of employers 
represent the interests of SMEs (either exclusively or as part of their representing a 
range of enterprises). Employers’ organisations cover a minority of the businesses in the 
country (according to national statistics, in 2003, 15% of companies were members of 
employers’ associations). They are relatively weak in terms of human and financial 
resources as well as services provided to their members.
Labour legislation
Both Hungary and Bulgaria implemented new labour codes (Hungary in 1992 and 
Bulgaria in 1993) providing a legislative framework for labour relations. However, the 
logic of the new labour codes reflects the employment practices of the large firms, which 
dominated the former state socialist political and economic regimes. These labour codes 
do not reflect the multiplicity of employment relations within the SME sector: in par­
ticular, the coexistence of formal and informal regulation and the dominance of indi­
vidual bargaining.
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Collective bargaining
In the CEECs under examination, as elsewhere in Europe, there is a clear relationship 
between the size of the firms and collective bargaining coverage. Table 3 shows the only 
statistical data available on the relationship between the size of the firm and collective 
agreement coverage in Hungary (there are no corresponding data for Bulgaria), which 
illustrate the weak role of collective bargaining within the SME sector.
Table 3: Collective bargaining by company size in Hungary (1998)
Size categories of firms (number of employees) Share of companies with collective agreements
5-20 persons* 0.1%
20-49 persons 1.1%
50-299 persons 11.7%
300-499 persons 46.4%
500-999 persons 67.3%
1 000 and more 75.4%
* Data on collective bargaining are often not available for firms employing fewer than four persons. 
Source: Neumann 2002, p. 6.
Employee voice and representation in the Bulgarian 
and Hungarian SMEs -  case study evidence from the 
SMALL project
Prior to the SMALL project there was little information on employment relations and 
employee voice in the emerging small businesses of the CEECs. The interest of 
researchers often lay with the emergence of the entrepreneurs themselves rather than 
the experience of employees. For many observers of the post-socialist countries during 
the early 1990s it was clear that the working conditions in the emerging SMEs were dif­
ferent from those in large enterprises, but this was interpreted as a ‘temporary phe­
nomenon’, which would pass with the development of the market economy. Over the 
last decade it has became evident that the nature of employment in SMEs was a fixed 
and not a temporary phenomenon. Examination of violations of social and even human 
rights (KNSB 2000) in SMEs has taken place largely on the basis of media reports rather 
than more in-depth research within SMEs.
Employment relations: the combination of formal and informal 
practices
The case studies of SMEs in Bulgaria and Hungary include three based in the inform­
ation and communications technology (ICT) sector (two from Bulgaria and one from 
Hungary); two in the clothing sector (one from each country); three from the hotel and 
catering sector (two from Bulgaria and one from Hungary); two Bulgarian case studies 
of very small retailers; one Hungarian study based in personal services and one study of
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a Bulgarian industrial subcontractor. Seven of the 12 cases were at or around the micro 
level (under ten employees); one was small (under 50) and four medium-sized (50-249). 
For Bulgaria, two of the case studies, one hotel and another ICT company, were direct­
ly foreign-owned (by Greek and Belgian interests) and there was a minority foreign 
owner in another ICT company.
On the basis of the case studies conducted by the SMALL project we argue that social 
relations in these SMEs cannot be characterised as unregulated or as dominated by the 
type of paternalist relations considered characteristic of family-run businesses. The fact 
that in the majority of these enterprises there was no union representation or workers’ 
councils does not mean that employment relations reflect the operation of unfettered 
owners’ and management prerogatives. Despite the lack of formal regulation in the 
firms that were studied, there were processes of adjustment and adaptation which will 
be discussed below.
The reality of social relations in SMEs in CEECs reflects a number of factors. Small and 
micro firms tend to be less ‘visible’ and less subject to regulation by the authorities, as a 
result of their ‘passive voice’ strategy of ‘evasion’ (Stoeva 2005).7 Informal employment 
relations and other non-institutional practices are typical examples of such a strategy. 
Often small firms have ‘closed’ recruitment practices based upon friendship and family. 
SMEs rarely cooperate in business associations8 and they may be reluctant to enter into 
relations with the state administration, which is supposed to encourage them. This 
behaviour is motivated by ‘self-protection’ and is associated with a lack of trust in the 
state and its institutions. Micro and small firms seem to draw back from the institution­
alised formal market relations’ mechanisms, including with regard to labour relations.
As has already been mentioned, this means that often there are important differences 
between legislation and practice. For example, in the case of a small Bulgarian retailer 
the manager stated his view that it was impossible fully to apply existing health and safe­
ty legislation in the field of small firms (in this case a small shop) -  in his opinion the law 
should be applied only in large production enterprises. Within most of the case studies 
employees under contract coexisted with workers whose status was unclear (for exam­
ple, probation was on the basis of verbal agreement or they had no formal contract).
In the case of both pay and working time, actual conditions in SMEs often did not cor­
respond to the strict stipulations of legislation or the individual labour contract. Often 
employees were unfamiliar with the content of their labour contract, not because they 
did not have a copy of it, but more likely because working conditions were so different 
in practice: thus, non-compliance with regulations was not seen as important.
7 The strategy of ‘evasion’ (of legislation) is used by those economic actors who generally possess less eco­
nomic freedom. The strategy is used to diminish high transaction costs such as access to information, 
taxation, capital, etc.
8 Examples from the Bulgarian small companies show that there is no interest for such membership. As one 
owner of an ICT company said: ‘this kind of organisation imitates activity and in practice they are doing 
nothing’.
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In terms of workplace representation in Bulgaria, enterprises with 20 or more employ­
ees that under law are required to have committees on working conditions, had rarely 
established them. The widespread existence in the case studies of employment relations 
based on ‘people you know’, on loyalty or trust, and the consequent informal character 
of employment relations discourages compliance with legal requirements on both sides 
-  by employers and employees. Social regulation based upon individual bargaining 
reflects the informal basis of employment relations, underpinned by personal loyalties, 
and coexists with employment relations based upon collective bargaining.9 Conflict res­
olution practices support the coexistence of both forms of regulation. For example, in 
the Bulgarian context violations of labour contract clauses were rarely resolved through 
institutional or representational channels, but rather through ‘exit’ or through the 
mobilisation of personal networks. The case studies suggest that this difference between 
prescription and practice is not only the result of unilateral decision-making by owners 
and managers. Often it is the result of mutually constructed compromises between the 
employer and the employees. These compromises are considered below.
Wage regulation: the dominance of individual and informal 
bargaining
The case studies demonstrate that in most instances wages are paid as ‘cash in hand’ in 
order to avoid social insurance payments and to increase disposable income for employ­
ees, especially when, at the level of the state, social security budgets are in deficit and 
unable to cope effectively with risk (health, pensions, unemployment). Paying a mini­
mum working salary does not lead to the total avoidance of social insurance, but it helps 
to avoid high social insurance payments. It is common practice that, in order to reduce 
the social cost of employment and the amount of income taxes paid by employees, the 
employer and employee agree that remuneration be divided into two parts: the first is 
the minimum wage (with the obligation of social insurance and income tax payment), 
while the second part is not taxed but goes directly to the employees. The fact that part 
of the wage is paid cash in hand is not something generally imposed by the employer -  
in the case of a Bulgarian food retail shop the management respondent reported that it 
was done in cooperation with the employee. There was thus a difference between the 
wages stated in labour contracts and the real remuneration received by employees. Even 
in medium-sized companies, such as the case study of a Bulgarian hotel, owned by an 
international chain, interviews showed that real salaries did not correspond to those in 
the labour contract as the employee respondent stated:
Only the minimal salary is written [in the contract] or a bit above the minimal. 
Generally, none o f the employers pays insurance on the real amount o f salary. They 
write smaller amounts (in order) to pay less insurance. Everywhere is like that.
In the Hungarian clothing industry, however, a wider problem was reported by a trade 
union leader: ‘many people who contact us report delayed or unpaid salaries.’
9 As indicated in Table 3, although individual bargaining dominates there is also a segment of the SME sec­
tor which is regulated by collective bargaining.
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Wage-related collective bargaining and the negotiation of minimal social insurance 
thresholds between social partners can, therefore, only partially influence this individu­
alised bargaining process, especially in sectors where the collective bargaining coverage 
is very low -  such as retail, hotels and catering or ICT in the case of Bulgaria. Wage lev­
els and structure (part paid officially and part paid unofficially) in general depend on the 
sector of activity and the size of the company, with informal practices tending to be more 
frequent in small companies. Wage formation mechanisms in Bulgaria appeared 
obscure in some of the case examined, for example in small shops, and mediated by the 
‘proximity’ of employees to the owners and managers. Only in some medium-sized 
enterprises owned by foreign investors or managers (for example, in the hotels and 
catering, and the chemical sectors in Bulgaria) did we observe more transparent wage 
formation mechanisms and performance-related pay based upon individual or team 
working. Bonus systems, while existing, often also seemed to be obscure and dependent 
on employer prerogative, but also sometimes informed by friendship/family relations 
with the employees.
Working time and working conditions
The case studies suggest that SMEs only partially observe labour legislation on working 
time. All of the owners and managers interviewed showed some acquaintance with the 
legislation. However, typical for these firms, despite some sectoral differences, is the 
informal organisation of work, including the regulation of working time. External envi­
ronmental factors, primarily the process of deregulation, define the relatively ‘liberal’ 
right of the employers to determine the working time of their business, for example, in 
retail.
Flexibility of working time is extremely important for both actors in ‘negotiations’. 
‘Longer working hours are among the three most often violated labour standards in 
Bulgarian SMEs during the post-communist transition, together with “work without a 
labour contract” and the “minimum working salary to avoid high social insurance pay­
ments’” (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(2001:1). Similarly in Hungary it has been reported that employees sometimes worked 
such hours in exchange for extra pay but more often in the hope that it would facilitate 
career development or in return for flexibility in working hours (in ICT and retail).
The case studies show that, depending on the sector or business activity, the employer 
might ask employees to work longer hours, during the weekend or national holidays, or, 
in tourism, during high season. In smaller case study organisations these longer working 
hours were not paid. Employees sometimes worked such hours in ‘exchange’ for extra 
pay (in larger enterprises), but more often in the hope that it would facilitate career 
development or in return for flexibility in working hours (in ICT and retail). In the ICT 
company case studies in Bulgaria employees accepted that they would stay until late 
when it was necessary, in return they could take ‘emergency’ leave whenever they want­
ed to, as long as the manager was informed. The impact of such individual bargaining 
power based on personal relations in small firms could be interpreted as providing more
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freedom and flexibility both to the employer and employees. In exchange for longer 
working hours the owners and managers give the employee more flexibility over work­
ing time, enabling them to take time off for domestic emergencies or for personal busi­
ness. However, from another perspective that informality might be seen as limiting the 
freedom of the employee to refuse extra work if asked to carry it out. In the case of a 
Bulgarian ICT company working time schedules were governed by external factors; 
employees could start work at any point in the period between 8.30 and 10.00 am and 
finish between 6.30 and 7.30 pm; each was free to allocate their own time as long as they 
fulfilled their working responsibilities (see also Alves et al., in this issue). The owner 
explained that each of the employees determined their working time in accordance with 
the needs of the clients:
When we have no work with the clients everyone is free to come and stay whenever 
he/she wants to.
However, at the same time:
We are serving a lot o f clients, they are the ones who determine the working time o f 
employees -  at what time to be at their offices and how tasks should be undertaken. 
Thus working time depends on clients’ requirements.
A further mismatch between labour legislation and employment practice in SMEs can 
be found in the length and regularity of rest periods, breaks and annual leave, which 
again are informally regulated.
The other domain for informal negotiation, at least in some SMEs, is health and safety. 
These ‘negotiated’ arrangements are built on the basis of mutually acceptable solutions, 
which could differ from what is prescribed by law. In general, compliance with labour 
legislation depends on the size of the company; the bigger the firm, the stricter the 
implementation of health and safety practices. The case studies demonstrated that in the 
micro and the small firms the level of health and safety observation is not rigorous. In 
those firms it appeared that neither employers nor employees were interested in health 
and safety. In Bulgaria, the recently introduced provision for the regular medical exam­
ination of employees is problematic, because the Labour Medicine Offices (LMOs) 
have no financial incentive to sign contracts with SMEs (due to the small number of 
employees). In small companies health and safety committees rarely exist. In medium­
sized companies, committees on Health and Safety Conditions formally exist in many 
cases but generally are not active (in some cases not functioning at all). One exception, 
illustrated in both the Bulgarian and the Hungarian case studies, are the subcontracting 
companies working for foreign contractors, who are keener to develop health and safe­
ty policies and measures under pressure from their contractors. However, even in these 
cases the observation of legislation might exist in theory rather than practice (for exam­
ple, the company might have a contract with an LMO, but it was unclear whether med­
ical examinations of personnel were actually carried out). According to the owners and 
managers interviewed in one of the Bulgarian case studies, they lack information from 
the authorities about health and safety requirements. Most of the respondents (exclud­
ing a case study in a larger hotel) agreed that the government programmes and legal
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initiatives were unclear and difficult to understand and adopt by employers, because of 
the investment they required.
Vocational training is rarely an issue addressed by Bulgarian SMEs. Evidence from the 
National Statistics Institute (NSI) survey on continuous vocational training (CVT) in 
Bulgaria showed that few hours are spent on training, particularly in micro and small 
enterprises; few resources are allocated to training activities and very few enterprises 
have a written plan and specific budget for CVT. The lack of formal training was borne 
out by the case studies, with the exception of initial on-the-job training. In Bulgaria 
there was no accredited training in any of the case study organisations, except in a 
tourism company, which followed the standards of an international chain. In another 
case -  a clothing company in Bulgaria, experienced workers were asked to train the new­
comers. In a number of the case studies self-generated training was a strategy adopted 
by the employees, not only prior to joining the firm, but also whilst working there.
Representation
In the majority of firms studied in Hungary and Bulgaria it appeared that both owners 
and employers and employees preferred the ‘informal regulation’ of employment rel­
ations. In the ICT cases examined in Bulgaria a manager insisted on the fact that:
Highly qualified employees have strong negotiating power and they do not need a medi­
ator to communicate with the manager.
It should be noted that the extremely fast development of SMEs in the emerging mar­
ket economies in central and eastern Europe did not allow the social and economic 
actors to focus on building an institutional framework in the sector. Economic and social 
policy-makers were more interested in modernisation based on foreign direct invest­
ment (as was the case in Hungary) or on struggles over property ownership (as was the 
case in Bulgaria) and the development of the SME sector received peripheral attention. 
Goss has proposed a typology of managerial control, based upon a combination of two 
dimensions: the ‘extent of employers’ economic dependence upon employees’ and the 
‘ability of employees to resist the exercise of the owners’ prerogative’ (Goss 1991). In the 
Hungarian case studies size was significant in shaping patterns of control, but was only 
one factor. In a number of cases employment relations were more formalised and codi­
fied, the growth of these organisations led to the increasing complexity of relationships 
between owners and managers, and employees, which required the use of new, stan­
dardised management tools to organise work and facilitate social consent (the changes 
arising from increased formalisation are discussed in Moore et al., in this issue). The 
case studies also draw attention to the growing importance of the outsourcing of non­
core activities. In a small Hungarian clothing company with six employees, four employ­
ees worked in the company factory and the other two employees were employed as 
home workers. In the new economy -  for example ICT -  there appears to be a move 
towards more formal management models. The case study of a Hungarian interactive 
media company shows that during a period of growth the owners hired an organisation­
al consultant. In cooperation with an international audit firm the company tried to cre­
ate a more efficient organisational model, first implementing separate cost centres, and
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later introducing project-based work organisation. These cases suggest that there is a 
need to understand the management model in order to interpret employment relations 
and the question of representation. Yet in this case study employees criticised manage­
rial decisions and one of the employees expressed an interest in more intensive particip­
ation in work-related decision-making:
Compared with my previous workplace it is a very bad thing that here we don’t 
know where we are going. We give a lot o f information to the management, but they 
inform us sometimes just at the last minute. Often in a given situation we don’t know 
what to do to help achieve the company’s long-term aims.
There is widespread belief that trade unions have difficulties in creating both represen­
tative institutions (e.g. collective bargaining) and employee participation structures (e.g. 
works councils) in SMEs. The opinion of a Hungarian trade union leader interviewed in 
the clothing industry sector summarises well the difficulties of implementing collective 
interest representation structures in the workplace in the post-socialist economies of the 
CEECs:
When big clothes factories closed down many people registered for unemployment ben­
efit, but at the same time they started working in the black economy. It is hard to make 
these people understand what disadvantages they can suffer without being registered 
employees because until they have other alternatives they will not leave their black sec­
tor job. Frightening them with the ghost o f  being without a pension and health insur­
ance is fairly useless until they are forced somehow to deal with this question. Many o f 
those who are employed in the black economy are retired or have this as a part-time or 
a second job. This system works reasonably well as long as employers pay correctly, but 
alongside this there are many unstable elements. The badly defined job contracts and 
unregistered salaries press employers to exclude any third party from the relationship 
between themselves and the employees. This often leads to the high vulnerability o f 
workers.
In some sectors there was low awareness of trade unions. The employees interviewed in 
the Bulgarian hotel did not know whether a trade union for those working in tourism 
existed. The same was true for employees working for a clothing company. This evi­
dence suggests that there is a deficit in communication between trade unions and 
employees in small companies.
The Hungarian company case studies also indicate low awareness of unions or a per­
ception that there was no need for them. Yet the absence of official institutions of labour 
relations does not mean a lack of social consent between the actors involved in the 
labour process. In other words, we have to stress the informality of employment rel­
ations and the rather paternalistic pattern of management in the firms surveyed. The 
case studies indicated that the intention of owners and managers of small firms to indi­
vidualise employment relationships also appeared to reflect the wishes of employees. 
This latter phenomenon can be attributed to a preference for informality, but also to 
employees’ lack of trust towards their trade unions. A  number of employees, inter­
viewed in both Bulgarian and Hungarian SMEs, shared a negative opinion of trade
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unions. According to a respondent working in a Bulgarian ICT company, the trade 
unions ‘are visible only on paper but not in practice’. All of the respondents in a 
Bulgarian retail enterprise had heard about trade unions, but none of them declared an 
interest in their activities. A worker in a textile company affirmed, ‘they pretend to have 
activities’. Another employee working for a hotel stated:
I  don’t rely on such organisations; in my opinion they just dangle their legs. They 
wouldn’t stand for the rights o f  people like us. To me, this is pure bureaucracy.
The belief of those employees is that for the moment unions cannot do anything for 
them and this reflects a wider legacy. In many cases, trade unions lost their legitimacy 
because of their support for the social and economic reforms and their failure to address 
the ensuing problem of dismissals from the large enterprises during the 1990s.
Collective bargaining
In Bulgaria collective agreements exist for certain sectors where cases studies were 
located (hotels and catering, commerce and clothing). However these agreements were 
not reflected in the case study organisations. There was only one example of collective 
bargaining and this was a subcontracting company, which had been part of a former 
large state-owned enterprise, acquired by a Belgian multinational. The trade union 
organisation had been established in 2003 and its founders were about 70 workers -  
almost all of them members of the trade union organisation of CITUB in the former 
company. The trade union section of the subcontracting company is a part of the union 
branch of the larger company of which it was a part. It had recently signed an agreement 
with the executive director for the collection of membership subscriptions (on the basis 
of a monthly deduction from salary) and was in the process of negotiating a collective 
agreement. This case study reflects the findings of the wider SMALL project, which 
showed that unionisation in SMEs may be inherited following the fragmentation of larg­
er companies (see Moore et al., in this issue) and underlines the importance of preserv­
ing a trade union presence in externalised activities of large enterprises. None of the 
Hungarian case studies were covered by collective bargaining.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
In the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary, as in many CEE countries, SMEs are not covered 
by collective labour agreements and representative structures rarely exist. This repre­
sents a challenge for both social partners (trade unions and employers’ organisations). 
Yet, the case study evidence of the SMALL project raises the question whether the SME 
sector is a priority for trade unions in CEECs. In Bulgaria and Hungary trade union rep­
resentatives interviewed for the project complained that access to workers in SMEs was 
difficult; at the same time workers reported that in many cases they had not heard about 
trade union attempts to gain access to them.
However the problem of access and formal representation in the companies not only 
reflects trade union strategies, but also depends on the extent to which both employers 
and workers can be ‘convinced’ of the utility of social dialogue and the development of
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a culture of dialogue in general. Small businesses in CEECs are relatively new and their 
characteristics have a specific impact on employment relations. The possibility of col­
lective mobilisation was undermined by individual strategies of survival, characteristic of 
the post-socialist economies, namely informal practices and secondary employment. 
Trade unions have responded to the problem of avoidance of regulation by SME 
employers (e.g. payment of minimum wages, lack of labour contracts) at national level, 
for example through the compulsory registration of labour contracts in Bulgaria and the 
introduction of minimal thresholds for representation.
However, there has been little activity at workplace level. In any case, the absence of for­
mal channels of representation in the SMEs hides the existence of a number of com­
promises between employers and employees over matters such as wages, working time 
or health and safety conditions. Trade union action should be based on a clear under­
standing of these social realities. In addition, we have to stress the absence of a mean­
ingful regional dimension in the labour relations systems in the former state-socialist 
economies. It may be necessary to rethink the existing sectoral approach to social dia­
logue and to combine this with a regional perspective. In this regard the CEECs could 
draw upon effective regionally based labour relations systems as exist in Italy.
A more ‘reflective capacity’ highlighting the differences and parallels between SMEs 
and the public sector and multinational companies could provide a better articulation of 
the representation of employees and better adaptation of appropriate organisational 
strategies. In the post-communist reality individual strategies for survival have under­
mined collective action; the history of unions’ support for liberalisation after the fall of 
communism and their failure to address the associated attacks on workers’ job security 
and living conditions have meant that unions have lost their legitimacy. They are now 
struggling to recruit and represent these same people now working in SMEs.
The case studies show that, on the one hand, SME owners often require information and 
support on employment issues and, on the other, workers need more information about 
their rights in the workplace. Workers have little knowledge of their rights to represen­
tation, particularly those in micro firms. This is especially relevant for health and safety 
and in relation to the legislative requirement for the establishment of representative 
committees. In this respect, the trade unions could be more active.
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Appendix 1: Distribution by size of manufacturing firms: planned economies 
versus capitalist ones (1970)
Planned economies1 Capitalist economies2
All manufacturing firms
1. Average number of employees per firm 197 80
2. Percentage of those employed by large firms3 66% 32%
Textile industry
1. Average number of employees per firm 355 81
2. Percentage of those employed by large firms 75% 17%
The ferrous metal industry
1. Average number of employees per firm 253 82
2. Percentage of those employed by large firms 61% 28%
The chemical industry
1. Average number of employees per firm 325 104
2. Percentage of those employed by large firms 79% 35%
The food-processing industry
1. Average number of employees per firm 103 65
2. Percentage of those employed by large firms 39% 16%
Notes
1 The sample includes the form er Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland.
2 The sample includes Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Japan and Sweden.
3 Defined as employing more than 500 people.
Source: J. Kornai (1992) The Socialist System: The Political Economy o f  Communism, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, p. 400.
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